A Tale of Three Countries, Dispersed Ownership and Greater Risk Taking Levels by Management: Risk Monitoring Tools in Bank Regulation and Supervision – Developments Since the Collapse of Barings Plc (Re – Visited)

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dc.creatorOjo, Mariane.B.
dc.date2011-01-15
dc.date.accessioned2025-03-06T13:42:22Z
dc.descriptionThis paper is aimed at explaining why higher concentrations of the ownership of large firms do not necessarily and automatically facilitate lower risk taking levels – where there is scope for the abuse of powers. As well as illustrating why effective corporate governance systems are essential in facilitating high levels of monitoring, accountability and disclosure, the paper also highlights why a consideration of the costs of ownership concentration and its benefits, is required in determining whether corporate governance systems will be effective or not.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifierhttp://eprints.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/1839/
dc.identifier.urihttp://itsupport.cu.edu.ng:4000/handle/123456789/29977
dc.languageen
dc.subjectHG Finance
dc.titleA Tale of Three Countries, Dispersed Ownership and Greater Risk Taking Levels by Management: Risk Monitoring Tools in Bank Regulation and Supervision – Developments Since the Collapse of Barings Plc (Re – Visited)
dc.typeArticle

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