Auditor Independence-Its Importance to the External Auditor's Role in Banking Regulation and Supervision
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The role of the external auditor in the supervisory process requires standards such as
independence,objectivity and integrity to be achieved. Even though the regulator and external auditor
perform similar functions, namely the verification of financial statements, they serve particular
interests. The regulator works towards safeguarding financial stability and investor interests. On the
other hand, the external auditor serves the private interests of the shareholders of a company. The
financial audit remains an important aspect of corporate governance that makes management
accountable to shareholders for its stewardship of a company2. The external auditor may however,
have a commercial interest too. The debate surrounding the role of external auditors focusses in
particular on auditor independence. A survey by the magazine “Financial Director” shows that the
fees derived from audit clients in terms of non-audit services are significant in comparison with fees
generated through auditing.3 Accounting firms sometimes engage in a practice called “low balling”
whereby they set audit fees at less than the market rate and make up for the deficit by providing
non audit services. As a result, some audit firms have commercial interests to protect too. There is
concern that the auditor's interests to protect shareholders of a company and his commercial interests do
not conflict with each other. Sufficient measures need to be in place to ensure that the external
auditor's independence is not affected. Brussels proposed a new directive for auditors to try to prevent
further scandals such as those of Enron and Parmalat.4 The new directive states that all firms listed on the
stock market must have independent audit committees which will recommend an auditor for shareholder
approval.5 It also states that auditors or audit partners must be rotated but does not mention the separation
of auditors from consultancy work despite protests that there is a link to compromising the independence of
auditors.6 However this may be because Brussels also shares the view that there is no evidence confirming
correlation between levels of non-audit fees and audit failures and that as a result, sufficient safeguards are
in place.7
This paper aims to consider the importance of auditor independence in the external auditor's role in banking
regulation and supervision. In doing so, it also considers factors which may threaten independence and
efforts which have been introduced to act as safeguards to the auditor's independence. It will also support the
claim that auditor independence is indeed central to the auditor's role in banking regulation and supervision.
Keywords
HG Finance